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Abstract  
This article explores the rise of ‘citizen journalism’ and considers its implications for the 
policing and news media reporting of public protests in the 21st Century. Our research 
focuses on the use and impact of multi-media technologies during the 2009 G20 Summit 
Protests in London, and evaluates their role in shaping the subsequent representation of 
‘protest as news’. The classic concepts of ‘inferential structure’ (Lang and Lang, 1955) and 
‘hierarchy of credibility’ (Becker, 1967) are re-situated within the context of the 24-7 news 
mediasphere to analyse the transition in news media focus at G20 from ‘protester violence’ 
to ‘police violence’. This transition is understood in terms of three key issues: the capacity of 
technologically empowered citizen journalists to produce information that challenges the 
‘official’ version of events; the inclination of professional and citizen journalists to actively 
seek out and use that information; and the existence of an information-communications 
marketplace that sustains the commodification and mass consumption of adversarial, anti-
establishment news.  
Keywords: citizen journalism, G20, hierarchy of credibility, Ian Tomlinson, inferential 
structure, news media, police violence, public protests  
 
Introduction 
Public protests, by their very nature, have the potential to provide dramatic newsworthy 
images of violence perpetrated by protestors, counter-protestors, police officers, or all 
three (Ericson and Doyle,1999; Bessel and Emsley, 2000, Button et al, 2002; Della Porta and 
Reiter, 1998; Della Porta et al, 2006; Noakes et al,2005; Waddington, D. 1992, 2007; 
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Waddington, P. A. 1991, 1997; Waddington et al, 2009; Rosie and Gorringe, 2009). Protests 
may descend into full scale riots, be policed in a heavy-handed, paramilitarised manner, or 
pass peacefully and without incident. Yet decades of research have demonstrated that there 
is no necessary correlation between events happening on the ground and the subsequent 
reporting of those ‘events as news’. Moreover, any disconnect between news media 
representations of public protests and ‘actual’ events has  been shown to favour a police 
perspective (Halloran et al, 1970; Chibnall, 1977; Ericson, et al, 1989, 1991; Reiner, 2000; 
Lawrence, 2000; Mawby, 2002a, b). In this article, we develop an analysis of the changing 
nature of news media reporting of public protests as evidenced in coverage of the G20 
Summit in London on 1st April 2009. Rosie and Gorringe’s (2009: 36) recent examination of 
‘mainstream’ newspaper coverage of G20 is based on the assertion that ‘protest events 
need to be contextualised by reference to how they are reported as well as how they are 
policed’. We shed further empirical light on this process of contextualisation by analysing 
the representation of G20 ‘as news’ across a range of online and offline media. We 
foreground the changing politics of reporting protests, and situate the coverage of G20 
within the wider context of socio-political, technological and economic transformations. 
Central to our argument is the rise of the ‘citizen journalist’, both as a key player in the news 
production process, and a key indicator of the changing contexts within which ‘news’ is 
generated, disseminated and consumed. Our discussion draws on two classic conceptual 
frameworks – Lang and Lang’s (1955) ‘inferential structures’ and Becker’s (1967) ‘hierarchy 
of credibility’. We seek to demonstrate the continuing usefulness of these frameworks by 
employing them to examine the transforming nature of police-news media-protester-public 
relations in the contemporary information-communications environment. 
First, we summarise the existing research on police-news media relations and the reporting 
of public order situations. Second, we discuss the rise of the citizen journalist as an 
important and developing feature of a transforming news media landscape. Third, we map 
the ‘events’ of the G20 protests in London 2009, and consider the initial inferential structure 
used by the news media  to make sense of the policing of the event. Fourth, we analyse the 
news media maelstrom around the death of Ian Tomlinson at the G20 protests, and 
examine how the initial inferential structure and flows of communication power were 
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disrupted by the intervention of citizen journalists. Finally, we return to our core conceptual 
framework to consider the wider implications of this case study.1   
 
Existing Research Findings: Police, Public Protests  and News Media 
Lang and Lang (1955) developed the concept of ‘inferential structures’ to explain how 
audience interpretations of news media coverage of politics both reflected and were 
determined by ‘unwitting bias’ on the part of news reporters which, in turn, could be 
attributed to reporters’ assumptions about their audience. They were interested to 
understand how the same manifest content could be constructed into multiple 
configurations, establishing selectively or partially representative frameworks of 
understanding – or ‘inferential structures’ – within which both newsmakers and audience 
could order and interpret the story, and which may subsequently ‘influence public 
definitions in a particular direction’ (Lang and Lang, 1955: 171). Four key variables are 
identified as significant: a) how interpretation, or lack of interpretation, of a particular 
incident affects the focus of attention; b) how the timing of specific information contributes 
to the frame of reference into which incidents are fitted; c) how this frame of reference 
crystallizes and tends to overshadow subsequent information to the point that even new 
information is ignored; d) how the tone or attitude toward the incident, both explicit and 
implied, affects cognition and interpretation even when critical faculties are exercised.  
Lang and Lang (1955) did not consider the differential influence of news sources in 
establishing and maintaining ‘inferential structures’. Becker (1967) offered a conceptual 
framework within which this problem could be addressed by developing the notion of a 
‘hierarchy of credibility’. His model proposed that in any community it is taken as given that 
‘members of the highest group have the right to define the way things really are’ (1967: 
241). Since matters of rank and status are contained within the mores of a society, this 
hierarchical belief has a ‘moral quality’. Well socialised community members are therefore 
‘morally bound to accept the definition imposed on reality by a superordinate group in 
preference to the definitions espoused by subordinates’ (ibid: 241). Furthermore, Becker 
argued, because institutions do not often perform as society would like them to, ‘officials 
                                                                
1
 We would like to thank the Editor and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback and suggestions. 
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develop ways of both denying their failures… and explaining those failures that cannot be 
hidden. An account of the institution from the point of view of subordinates therefore casts 
doubt on the official line and may possibly expose it as a lie’ (ibid: 243; emphasis added). 
The situation is complicated further in overtly political situations because ‘Judgements of 
who has a right to define the nature of reality… become matters of argument’ (ibid: 244).  
In the first substantive analysis of news media reporting of public protests, Halloran et al 
(1970) combined the notion of ‘inferential structures’ with Galtung and Ruge’s (1965) 
analysis of ‘news values’ to explore news reporting of the 1968 anti-Vietnam War 
demonstrations in London’s Grosvenor Square. They demonstrate how despite the 
commitment to ‘balanced’ coverage, the protests were defined early on in the news media 
as likely to involve violent confrontation between the forces of law and order (the police) 
and the forces of anarchy (the demonstrators). Though the protests turned out to be largely 
peaceful, the event was still reported in line with the dominant inferential structure – the 
‘framework of violence’ – and thus it was the issue of violence, minimal though it was, that 
provided ‘the news’. This work focused on news routines and the activities of journalists 
rather than sources and, echoing Lang and Lang’s (1955) idea of ‘unwitting bias’, illustrated 
the role of the news media in ‘defining the situation and in cultivating the assumption that 
this is the way it is’ (Halloran et al, 1970: 315: emphasis in original). Building on this 
platform, Marxist studies of police-news media relations in the 1970s explored how the 
unequal distribution of media access and influence, the ideological orientation of news 
media, and the politicisation of law and order contribute to the reproduction of dominant 
ideology. In this context, Becker’s (1967) ‘hierarchy of credibility’ provided a framework for 
developing a more explicitly ideological reading of just who gets to say ‘this is the way it is’, 
and why. For Hall et al (1978), news reporting of crime and disorder was shaped by the 
virtual monopoly of elite sources who collectively represent and command institutional 
power – those at the top of the ‘hierarchy of credibility’. The police were viewed as 
structurally and culturally advantaged in establishing the ‘primary definition’ – or dominant 
inferential structure – that subsequently set the agenda for future debate (Hall et al., 1978; 
Chibnall, 1977). Whilst the police perspective might be contested, it could seldom be 
meaningfully challenged, still less altered. 
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Subsequent research sought to develop a multi-dimensional understanding of news 
reporting of crime and disorder through deeper engagement with journalists, sources and 
audiences. Despite considerable variation in theoretical and methodological approach (see 
Greer, 2010), post-Marxist studies confirmed that the police are ‘primary definers’ at the 
top of the ‘hierarchy of credibility’, and that a pro-police perspective is structurally and 
culturally advantaged, if not necessarily guaranteed (Tumber, 1982; Schlesinger et al, 1983; 
Ericson et al, 1989, 1991; Schlesinger, 1989; Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994).  
More recent investigations have explored growing police awareness of the potential impact 
of media representations on public perceptions of the legitimacy and authority of police 
work (Mawby, 2002a, b; Lovell, 2003; Chermak and Weiss, 2005; Chermak et al, 2006). 
Sensitisation to the damaging consequences of adverse news coverage on the ‘brand’ has 
been a key driver of extensive investment in media and public relations work (Hohl et al, 
2010). Police forces now have well-resourced communications offices to ensure that ‘brand’ 
image and message are accurately and/or positively represented to key stakeholder 
audiences. What McLaughlin (2007) defines as ‘image-led policing’ involves the 
development of proactive and reactive media strategies designed to maintain the police 
position at the top of the ‘hierarchy of credibility’, and thus to advantage the institution in 
establishing the dominant inferential structure in news coverage.  
 
Limitations of Previous Research Findings: The Transforming News Environment and the 
Rise of ‘Citizen Journalism’ 
The contemporary reporting of crime and public protests takes place within a radically 
transformed information-communications environment. Yet even the most recent 
criminological research has paid limited attention to important changes in news gathering 
practices brought about by the emergence of a global, interactive 24-7 news mediasphere. 
Within media studies, these changes have been well documented (McNair, 2006; Fenton, 
2009; Deuze, 2008). In a digital multi-media age, a proliferation of news platforms, sites and 
formats has been paralleled by ‘an exploding array of news sources, or producers of content’ 
(Pavlik, 2008: 79, emphasis in original), leading to the creation of an unprecedented amount 
of potentially newsworthy information, and a remarkable number of ‘news spaces’ in which 
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to broadcast/publish it. In the process, increasingly sophisticated, interactive news 
audiences are reconstituted as consumers.  
The proliferation of news gatherers, sources and spaces places a premium on distinctiveness 
and interactivity, which can disrupt the traditional news media orientation toward the 
police perspective. Indeed, in certain instances, there is no ‘perspective’ as such. The police 
are increasingly enmeshed in a complex web of internal and external stakeholders and 
‘publics’ with different agendas and needs who are willing and able to use the news media 
and Internet to represent their interests. Cottle (2008) has noted the extent to which 
protest groups and demonstrators have become ‘reflexively conditioned’ to get their 
message across and activate public support. The contemporary news media environment 
offers ‘new political opportunities for protest organizations, activists and their supporters to 
communicate independently of mainstream news media’ (ibid: : 853; see also ; De Luca and 
Peeples, 2002; Bennett, 2003; McCaughey and Ayers, 2003; Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2004; 
Hutchinson and Lester, 2006; Maratea, 2008). Protesters are aware that their activities have 
to compete proactively for space in the fast-moving, issue-based attention cycle that defines 
the 24-7 news mediasphere (Oliver and Maney, 2000). In addition, as Milne (2005) argues, 
there has been a notable shift in political perspective amongst sections of the Fourth Estate 
as they attempt to prise open the political process. Market-driven newspapers in particular 
are much more willing to initiate and/or support anti-government/establishment campaigns 
and protests, and in certain respects have become ‘ideologically footloose’. Adherence to a 
deferential ‘inferential structure’ reinforcing a traditional ’hierarchy of credibility’ does not 
boost readership sales. ‘Manufacturing dissent’ by combining the campaigning capacities of 
the press with popular protest does (see also Lloyd, 2004). Consequently, there is the 
increased possibility of highly damaging images and representations of state institutions 
such as the police materialising and circulating in the offline and online news media. Of 
crucial importance here is the rise of the citizen journalist.  
Allen and Thorsen (2009) define citizen journalism as ‘the spontaneous actions of ordinary 
people, caught up in extraordinary events, who felt compelled to adopt the role of a news 
reporter’. Peat (2010) provides a vivid description: ‘Armed with cellphones, BlackBerries or 
iPhones, the average Joe is now a walking eye on the world, a citizen journalist, able to take 
a photo, add a caption or a short story and upload it to the Internet for all their friends, and 
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usually everyone else, to see’. He demonstrates how a photo can be taken on a mobile 
phone, tweeted on Twitter.com, picked up by other users, and disseminated like a virus 
online. Internet monitoring by mainstream news media outlets means that dramatic 
amateur photographic, audio or video content can become headline news. In recognition of 
this unprecedented news-gathering potential, news organisations have established formal 
links to encourage citizens to submit their mobile news material (Pavlik, 2008: 81; Glaser, 
2004; Reich, 2008; Wallace, 2009). Citizen-generated content, in turn, can generate other 
information and images, fuelling  ‘endless remixes, mashups and continuous edits’ (Deuze, 
2008: 861). Citizen journalism has been instrumental not only in providing newsworthy 
images, but also in defining the news itself – in shaping representations of key global events. 
The defining images of the 7/7 London bombings in 2005, probably the watershed in the 
emergence of a highly interactive and participatory contemporary news production process, 
were provided by citizen journalists (Sambrook, 2005).  
The emergence of the citizen journalist carries significant implications for professional news 
gathering organisations and official institutions who would seek to control the news. As 
Castells (2009: 413) argues, ‘The greater the autonomy of the communicating subjects vis-a-
vis the controllers of societal communication nodes, the higher the chances for the 
introduction of messages challenging dominant values and interests in communication 
networks’. Novel forms of selecting, gathering, processing, and disseminating ‘news’ are 
transforming communication circuits. On the one hand, there are real issues of simulation, 
manipulation, partisanship and lack of accountability. On the other, ‘right here, right now’ 
citizen journalism can bring authenticity, immediacy and realism to news stories through the 
production of dramatic and visually powerful ‘evidence’ of events ‘as they happen’.  
 
Data  Sources and Methods  
Given the sheer volume of available data, we have found it easier to theorise the 24-7 news 
mediasphere than to research it. To conduct this analysis we constructed a data set based 
on a range of online and offline news media, most particularly the press. The first stage of 
our data collection involved the analysis of mainstream newspapers representing a wide 
spectrum, from broadsheet to tabloid and from political left to right. Newspapers were 
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collected and read in hard copy for an eight week period – from 1st March 2009 until April 
25th 2009 – to provide full coverage of the run up to and aftermath of G20, as well as 
coverage of the protests themselves. Hard copies of the London Evening Standard, London’s 
major newspaper, were also included in the analysis. Newspaper websites and the 
LexisNexis database were searched to ensure the comprehensiveness of the data set. In 
addition to sorting via date, location, extent of coverage and visual imagery, G20 items were 
researched for story focus, sources, perspectives, editorialisation and commentary. 
Supplementary material from television news broadcasts were analysed and, where 
possible, recorded on April 1st and 2nd, with some key news programmes being sourced via 
Internet ‘on demand’ broadcast services. Since internet materials are less perishable and 
frequently exist in perpetuity, for example content uploaded to YouTube, these were 
examined as the research developed. The second stage of our data collection involved 
analysing the transcripts, final reports and press releases generated by the official inquiries 
into the policing of the G20 Summit. We also used the Ian Tomlinson Family Campaign 
website (www.iantomlinsonfamilycampaign.org.uk). In addition, both authors were present 
for specific time periods during the G20 protests in the City of London on 1st April and the 
Excel Centre on 2nd April. This enabled first-hand observation of the initial policing operation 
and the preliminary interactions between the police, protestors, bystanders and the news 
media. Primary photographic evidence was gathered in the City of London on the morning 
of 1st April.  
It is not our intention in this article to present an in depth discourse or content analysis on 
the full corpus of G20 news coverage. Rather, we examine the dominant themes and 
patterns we have identified across reporting of the policing of G20. More specifically, we 
seek to analyse the dramatic re-orientation of news media attention, following the death of 
one citizen, and to explain this re-orientation sociologically in terms of wider transitions in 
the contemporary information-communications environment.  
 
‘We predict a riot’: the Inferential Structuring of Policing the G20 Summit  
The G20 demonstrations in the City of London on 1st April 2009 provide an important  
insight into the disruptive impact of citizen journalism upon routinised police-news media 
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relations. They also illustrate the shifting nature of definitional power in the 24-7 news 
mediasphere.  
The Initial Inferential Structure around ‘Protester Violence’  
In the countdown to the G20 protests, both the police and the press drew from a well 
established or default news frame in order to interpret and explain the unfolding events. 
This default news frame was ‘protester violence’: that is, there was a clear sense that the 
demonstrations would be marred by violence, and that this violence would come from the 
protesters (Gorringe and Rosie, 2009). An initial inferential structure developed around the 
news frame of ‘protester violence’, and it was this framework – reflecting and reinforcing 
the police perspective – that shaped newspaper coverage in terms of ‘what the story was’ 
and ‘how it would develop over time’. Though the inferential structure took a number of 
different forms  across the press, all could be traced back to the original constitutive news 
frame of ‘protester violence’.  
In February 2009, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) had warned that a violent G20 
Summit could herald a ‘summer of rage’ (Guardian, 23 February 2009). In mid-March, in  
what might be understood as the ‘modal article’, constructed from a detailed Metropolitan 
Police Service (MPS) briefing , a number of ‘unique’ factors were identified as having the 
clear potential to generate problems for ‘Operation Glencoe’ and the policing of G20. First, 
an unprecedented number of public order events were taking place simultaneously across 
London, including: the arrival of  G20 delegations, including US President Barak Obama, all 
of whom would have to be transferred from official residences to the G20 forum and to 
official receptions; a state visit to the UK by the President of Mexico; and an international 
football match at Wembley. In addition, on Saturday 28th March, a TUC co-ordinated G20-
related ‘Put people First’ rally composed of 150 charities and unions would take place in 
Hyde Park.2 Since any one of these high-profile events could present a target for a terrorist 
strike, the logistical pressures on police resources would be massive. Second, the number of 
protestors, and therefore the potential for trouble, could be swelled significantly because of 
public anger at the handling of the financial crisis. And thirdly, a coalition of  anarchist, anti-
                                                                
2
 The ‘Put People First’ march passed off without incident and, as Gorringe and Rosie (2009) note, with little 
substantive reporting.  
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globalisation, anti-war and environmentalist ‘direct action’ groupings had declared their 
intention to ‘take’ the financial heart of the City of London and to capture the news agenda. 
These groups were using a range of media to communicate their plans and exchange views 
on how the days of protest would develop, where the ‘flashpoints’ would be, and the 
likelihood that the police would over-react. MPS Commander Simon O’Brien clarified for 
reporters how the police would respond to different kinds of protest:  
There are groups that by their very ethos won't talk to us. The groups which enter 
dialogue with us, we will facilitate [throughout their events]... We will not tolerate 
anyone breaking the law, be it by attacking buildings, people or our officers... We are 
looking to police peaceful protest. We don't talk in terms of riots. If anyone wants to 
come to London to engage in crime or disorder, they will be met with a swift and 
efficient policing response (BBC, 30 March 2009).3  
The MPS briefing also provided the press with a temporal framework for predicting how 
events would unfold. The critical flashpoint for violent confrontations would not be the ‘Put 
People First’ rally , nor the actual G20 Summit on 2nd April, but 1st April. According to the 
MPS , April 2nd would not be a problem because they had created a ‘sterile environment’ at 
the Excel Centre in Docklands, making it impossible for large numbers of protestors to 
gather there. In contrast, a variety of ‘direct action’ events were planned for 1st April: a 
‘Fossils and Financial Fools’ Day’/G20 Meltdown march on the Bank of England; ‘Climate 
Camp’ establishing a base outside the European Climate Exchange in Bishopsgate; a ‘Stop 
the War Coalition’ march from the US Embassy to Trafalgar Square; and various other 
protest events.  
Thus for several weeks before G20, newspapers ran in-depth stories about the ‘cat and 
mouse’ tactics of both police and protest groups. They were interpreted and ordered 
                                                                
3
 The MPS expressed their determination to avoid the chaotic scenes of the May Day 2000 ‘Reclaim the 
Streets’ demonstrations in London, the City Riots of 1999, and the G8 in Genoa in 2001, where one protester 
was killed and hundreds more injured. All police leave had been cancelled in London for Wednesday and 
Thursday. Some 84,000 police man-hours across six police forces had been allocated to the £7.5 million 
‘Operation Glencoe’. The MPS would be supported by the City of London and British Transport Police, with 
Bedfordshire, Essex and Sussex police securing the arrival and transfer of G20 delegations. In addition, City 
firms were employing their own private security consultants. However, little information was released on how 
the MPS would police G20. 
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through an explicit initial inferential structure built around the default news frame of 
inevitable ‘protester violence’:  
‘The new activism: the voices in G20’s chorus of protest’ (Observer, 8th March 2009: 
28) 
‘Biggest police operation for a decade to be launched at G20 Summit in London’ (Daily 
Telegraph, 13th March 2009: 2) 
‘Anarchists plan City demo for Day G20 leaders are in London’ (Daily Mail, 17th March 
2009: 5) 
‘Police try to forestall ‘innovative’ G20 summit protestors’ (Guardian 21st March 2009: 
11) 
‘£7 million to police G20 Summit: ‘We have to be innovative to match protestors’, says 
officer in charge’ (Daily Mail, 21st March 2009: 7) 
‘Office staff warned of confrontation as City braces for mass G20 protests’ (Observer 
23rd March 2009: 7) 
‘Flashpoint London’ (London Evening Standard, 27th March, front page) 
‘Police tactics queried as Met says G20 protests will be ‘very violent’ (Guardian, 28th 
March 2009: 1) 
‘We predict a riot; meet the anarchists plotting to overthrow capitalism’ (Independent 
on Sunday, 29th March 2009: 10-11) 
‘There still may be trouble ahead’ (Sunday Telegraph, 29th March 2009: 4-5) 
‘G20 protestors face police with tasers’ (Sunday Times, 29th March: 3) 
‘Cops to be given tasers’ (Daily Mirror, 30th March: 6) 
‘Anarchists planning to storm City banks’ (London Evening Standard, 31st March 2009: 
2) 
‘London braced for G20 Onslaught’ (Financial Times, 31st March: 4) 
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‘Activists dig in on the fringes of the city for direct action protests (Guardian, 1st April 
2009:6-7) 
Several news stories disclosed protest groups’ concerns that the MPS was ‘talking up’ the 
possibility of protestor violence to justify a heavy-handed paramilitary policing operation. 
Nevertheless, when, as predicted, protesters clashed with police on 1st April, the inferential 
structure crystallised and now explicitly set the context for newspapers’ interpretation of 
events at G20. This, in turn, determined which ‘meanings’ around policing, protest and  
disorder were fed via the press into the public sphere. The London Evening Standard led  
that evening with a front-page story, dominated by a full-colour photograph of riot police 
surrounding a protestor as he lies injured on the road outside the Bank of England, 
headlined ‘Violence Sweeps City on Obama’s Big Day’. This dramatic interpretation was 
reproduced with remarkable consistency across the press the following day, as coverage 
foregrounded the actions of ‘hard core’ anarchists and extremists (Gorringe and Rosie, 
2009). The police, in contrast, were portrayed as the ‘thin blue line’ and victims of 
inexcusable protester violence. Visual quality and dramatic impact were enhanced with 
images of ‘anarchists’ attacking the Royal Bank of Scotland and of demonstrators clashing 
with police at the corner of the Bank of England. The collective press position was that 
police lines had come under siege from violent demonstrators:  
‘Anarchy in the UK: rioters blitz city’ (Sun 2 April 2009, p.6-7) 
‘Anarchy does not rule the UK’ (Daily Express, 2 April, front page) 
‘Police battle rampaging city mobs’ (ibid) 
‘Baton charges as protesters break into RBS branch’ (Independent, 2nd April 2009: 4)  
‘Love and hate’ (Daily Mail, 2nd April 2009) 
‘Undercover with the anarchist mob’ (ibid)‘Protesters clash with police at RBC office’ 
(Daily Mirror, 2nd April 2009: 9) 
‘The mob tamed’ (ibid) 
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‘Carnival atmosphere turns ugly after demonstrators storm into RBS branch’ 
(Guardian, 2nd April 2009: 2) 
Equally important was the press consensus that ‘Operation Glencoe’ had been a success for 
the MPS, involving limited disruption and damage to property, and the arrest of 93 
troublemakers. A few journalists expressed reservations about what was viewed as the 
police’s disproportionate, heavy-handed treatment of peaceful protesters. There was wider 
criticism of the MPS tactic of ‘kettling’ that kept protestors contained in tightly controlled  
sites for hours. And some stories were accompanied by dramatic colour images of blood 
soaked protestors. But it was the police perspective on protestor violence that dictated the 
news agenda.  
At 11.30pm on 1st April the MPS released a statement disclosing that a man had died in the 
area of the Bank of England (MPS statement, 1st April):  
A member of the public went to a police officer to say that there was a man who had 
collapsed around the corner. That officer sent two police medics through the cordon 
line and into St. Michael’s Alley where they found a man who had stopped breathing. 
They called for support at about 19.30. The officers gave him an initial check and 
cleared his airway before moving him back behind the cordon line to a clear area 
outside the Royal Exchange building where they gave him CPR. The officers took the 
decision to move him as during this time a number of missiles – believed to be bottles 
– were being thrown at them. LAS (the London Ambulance Service) took the man to 
hospital where he was pronounced dead. The IPCC [Independent Police Complaints 
Commission] has been informed. 
Partly due to the timing and context of the statement, the press situated the death within 
the existing inferential structure, and reproduced the police narrative that the man had died 
in the midst of chaotic protester violence. Journalists’ reports and protest group websites 
conflicted over whether or not the dead man, Ian Tomlinson, was a protestor, and where he 
had collapsed. On 2nd April the IPCC confirmed that it had been asked by the police to 
review Tomlinson’s death. An immediate post-mortem examination established that he had 
suffered a heart attack and died of natural causes. Whatever Tomlinson’s G20 protest 
connections, the police position  was that he had not come into contact with officers prior 
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to collapsing in the street. The official statement on the cause of death seemed to make 
sense when details of Tomlinson’s life emerged. He was a newspaper vendor in poor health, 
coping with a drink problem, living alone and apart from his family in a hostel in the East 
End of London.   
What is important to establish here is that early press coverage both reflected and 
reinforced an explicit inferential structure built around the default news frame of ‘protester 
violence’ that prioritised the police perspective on the events of G20. The police were 
portrayed as the ‘thin blue line’, the protesters as the violent mob. Coverage of the G20 
protests thus developed into a story of unqualified and intentional protester violence 
against the forces of law and order and respectable society. Initial reports on the death of 
Ian Tomlinson, though presented as a story in its own right, were ordered and interpreted 
within this inferential structure. Portrayed as a tragic and unavoidable death by natural 
causes, a position confirmed by the IPCC and coroner’s report, news reports promoted the 
image of violent protesters hurling bottles at dutiful police officers who were doing all they 
could to help a critically ill man in extremely difficult circumstances. The police perspective 
was quickly established and seemed stable. It was further reinforced when, on 3rd April, 
journalists were allowed to join follow-up police raids on squats used by the alleged ‘ring 
leaders’ of the groups accused of orchestrating the violence. However, the MPS’s position 
on Tomlinson’s death began to unravel as alternative information came to light. It would be 
the reinterpretation of the circumstances of Tomlinson’s death, on the basis of citizen 
journalism, that would critically destabilise this initial inferential structure and radically 
transform how the policing of G20 was interpreted and understood.  
Caught on Film: the Destabilised Inferential Structure and the Transition from ‘Protester 
Violence’ to ‘Police Violence’  
One of the most noticeable characteristics of the 1st April protests was the sheer density and 
variety of recording devices being used by professional and citizen journalists, private 
businesses, demonstrators, the police, and passers-by. Furthermore, because of police 
containment tactics, police-news media-protester-public interactions took place in 
extremely close spatial proximity, which simultaneously created a captive audience to 
surrounding events. The policing of G20 was also being scrutinised by independent monitors 
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in attendance because of concerns about recent public order policing  tactics such as those 
deployed at the Climate Camp in Kent in August 2008. The result was a hyper-mediatised, 
high-surveillance context within which control of the information and communication 
environment would be difficult to maintain.  
As photographs of Ian Tomlinson appeared in the news media and online, witnesses began 
to emerge, claiming they had seen the man interacting with the police on several occasions. 
Their testimonies, significantly brought first to the news media rather than the IPCC, 
challenged the official line that bottles had been thrown at police while they were attending 
to Tomlinson after his collapse. It soon transpired that Tomlinson, in attempting to make his 
way home from work, had in fact come into contact with the police on several occasions 
prior to collapsing at 7.30pm. In a pivotal news media intervention, on 3rd April The 
Guardian informed City of London Police, who were responsible for conducting the IPCC 
investigation into the death, that it had obtained timed and dated photographs of 
Tomlinson lying on the pavement at the feet of riot police. On 5th April The Guardian 
published several of these photographs, along with the testimony of three named witnesses 
who claimed they had seen Tomlinson being hit with a baton and/or thrown to the ground 
by officers. The next day the IPCC confirmed that Tomlinson had come into contact with 
officers prior to his death, but continued to contest reports that he had been assaulted. 
Serious concerns about the policing of G20 were aired across the weekend news media on 
4th and 5th April, accompanied by the first calls for a public inquiry. Ian Tomlinson was 
becoming a cause célèbre. Further concern was expressed over allegations that riot police 
had used violence to clear the protestor squats and the Climate Camp at Bishopsgate, and 
that numerous officers had concealed their identification numbers. News attention was 
starting to shift, and the inferential structure established around the default news frame of 
‘protester violence’ was destabilising. The decisive moment came on April 7th, when The 
Guardian website broadcast mobile phone footage that appeared to provide clear evidence 
of police violence against Tomlinson minutes before he collapsed. The footage had been 
handed to the newspaper by an American fund manager who said, ‘The primary reason for 
me coming forward is that it was clear the family were not getting any answers’ (Guardian, 
7th April 2009). It shows Tomlinson walking, hands in pockets, seemingly oblivious to an 
adjacent group of officers, some dog handlers, and others in riot gear. He presents no 
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discernible threat to public order. Without warning, an officer in helmet and balaclava 
pushes Tomlinson forcefully from behind, knocking him to the ground. When slowed-down, 
the footage captures the officer swiping at Tomlinson’s legs with a baton, and then pushing 
him hard in the back. Police stand and watch as passers-by help Tomlinson to a sitting 
position, where he appears to remonstrate with the officers in question. He is then helped 
to his feet, again by passers-by, and is seen walking away. Soon afterwards he will collapse 
beyond the view of this camera. The footage does not show any extenuating circumstances 
that might justify the police officer’s actions.  
The Guardian shared the footage with the news channels of the BBC, Sky and Channel 4. It 
was also added to various online news sites, and to YouTube. The footage was picked up 
globally and was by far the most read story on The Guardian's website, with about 400,000 
views. It initiated intensive blogging and a letter-writing campaign to parliament. 
Authenticated, real-time footage of events surrounding Ian Tomlinson’s death provided a 
focus for the growing body of complaints, led by the Tomlinson family who had now 
established a campaign website (http://www.iantomlinsonfamilycampaign.org.uk), about 
(a) the overall policing of G20, and (b) the actions of officers attached to specialist units.  
On 8th April new footage shot from a different angle, retrieved from a broken Channel 4 
camera, showed an officer striking at Mr. Tomlinson from behind with a baton and then 
pushing him to the ground. This combined footage set the agenda not only for other news 
agencies, but also for the response of the MPS and the IPCC. The MPS subsequently 
confirmed that four officers had come forward in relation to the investigation into the death 
of Mr. Tomlinson. 
The initial inferential structure – built around the news frame of ‘protester violence’ and 
reinforcing the police perspective on the G20 protests and Ian Tomlinson’s death – was 
destabilising and in transition. The focus of rolling news media coverage, now extending 
well beyond the press, was shifting from ‘protester violence’ – the actions of hard-core 
anarchists – to ‘police violence’ – the actions of official state representatives tasked with 
public protection. Fuelled by a combination of professional and citizen-generated content, 
an increasingly critical news media highlighted two major issues that challenged not only 
the police handling of the G20 protests, but also the credibility of the MPS:  
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(a) the problem of police violence as indicated by the sheer number of videoed 
incidents and witness statements that were coming to light.  
(b) the possibility that the MPS statement was intended to mislead on the events 
surrounding Ian Tomlinson’s death.  
A collective realignment had taken place – a press campaign was underway for the MPS  to  
account not only for the actions of ‘rogue officers’, but also for the policing of G20. On 8th 
April, both the Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, and the MPS Commissioner Sir Paul 
Stephenson, acknowledged the need for an independent inquiry, and confirmed that one of 
the officers shown in the footage had been suspended. The IPCC reversed its decision to 
allow City of London police to investigate Tomlinson’s death and called for more witnesses 
to come forward and to hand over any footage. A second post-mortem was carried out at 
the request of the Tomlinson family. The case featured heavily  across the news media on 
the weekend of 11th and 12 April.  
The IPCC had initially claimed that there were no CCTV cameras near the assault. However, 
on 14th April the London Evening Standard identified several cameras in the immediate area. 
On 15th April the MPS agreed to an inquiry by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
(HMIC) into its public order policing tactics and also to re-examine its own G20 video 
footage. The next day The Guardian was handed more photographs showing Ian Tomlinson 
interacting with police approximately 15 minutes before he collapsed. By now it had been 
confirmed that, of the 145 complaints lodged with the IPCC, 70 related to claims of 
excessive police force. 
On 17th April the second autopsy established that Tomlinson had died from abdominal 
haemorrhaging and the MPS confirmed that a Territorial Support Group (TSG) police officer 
would be questioned on suspicion of manslaughter. The MPS’s problems intensified when 
footage uploaded to YouTube showed further police violence against a woman attending 
the 2nd April memorial vigil for Mr. Tomlinson. In this footage, Nicola Fisher is seen arguing 
with an officer before he back-hands her in the face and then, when she protests, hits her  
on the legs with a police baton. The officer’s shoulder identification number appears to have 
been obscured. Fisher was able to amplify her side of the story by selling it to the Daily 
Express and Daily Star, who on 17th April published front-page photographs of her injuries. 
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She was represented by the PR agent, Max Clifford. On 19th April the Sunday Times 
broadcast fresh footage of police officers using batons and shields on protestors.  
During  the following week, as the Home Affairs Committee inquiry into the policing of G20 
began to hear evidence, the police attempted to defend their tactics. Sir Ken Jones, the 
head of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Sir Paul Stephenson, the MPS 
Commissioner, and Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London, all complained about unfair news 
coverage of the police. However, these statements had marginal impact on the transforming 
news agenda. In the course of the week both Nick Hardwick, the Chair of the IPCC, and 
Denis O’Connor, the Chief of HMIC, expressed concerns about the G20 policing tactics. On 
21st April The Guardian presented the IPCC with five new citizen-generated videos of police 
aggression. On 22nd April Channel 4 News broadcast a frame-by-frame analysis of events 
leading up to and including the moment when Ian Tomlinson was struck by a police officer 
and fell to the ground. The IPCC tried unsuccessfully to secure a court order preventing the 
broadcast on the basis that it could be prejudicial to its investigation. That same day Sky 
News released new footage, taken by a photographer from the top of the Royal Exchange, 
that appeared to show still further police violence in the form of punching, baton strikes and 
elbows to the face of protesters who had been ‘kettled’. And a third post-mortem 
examination was carried out on Ian Tomlinson, at the request of the lawyers for the officer 
being questioned in relation to the death. On 24th April, Sky News published a photograph of 
Ian Tomlinson after his collapse, which appeared to show bruising to his forehead. It was 
consistent with video footage that captured Tomlinson’s head hitting the pavement after 
being pushed by the police officer. This evidence contradicted the findings of the first 
inquest.  
By this stage, then, the initial inferential structure around ‘protester violence’ – so routinely 
and un-controversially established in the run up to the G20 protests – had disintegrated, 
and a new inferential structure – initiated and driven by the raw content of citizen 
journalism – had crystallised  around the news frame of ‘police violence’. The emergence of 
this dominant inferential structure was evident in the shifting focus of news media interest, 
and how the ‘story’ of G20 was re-ordered and re-interpreted within that context. But 
further, and crucially, this dominant inferential structure was evident in the extensive and 
highly public official response that asked probing questions about the MPS’s public order 
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policing strategy, and foregrounded the importance of two media-related phenomena: the 
need for the MPS to develop more positive police-press relations, and the implications of 
the rise of the citizen journalist for the policing of public events.  
 
The Aftermath of G20  
The impact of citizen-generated content around the death of Ian Tomlinson extended well 
beyond establishing the dominant inferential framework that shaped news coverage and 
public understanding of the G20 protests. It also resulted in numerous official inquiries into 
‘Operation Glencoe’ and raised wider questions about public order policing and the  news 
media  in the 21st Century (IPCC, not yet in public domain; HMIC, 2009; House of Commons 
Home Affairs Committee, 2009; Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2009; Metropolitan 
Police Authority, 2010). The resulting reports acknowledged a  successful operation, where 
upwards of 35,000 protesters were marshalled by several thousand police officers largely 
without incident. Nevertheless, they all expressed  concern that the high-profile exposure of 
police violence, however isolated, could seriously damage public confidence in the police. 
The reports queried the appropriateness of the MPS’s public order policing tactics, 
highlighting the deployment of untrained officers in combustible situations, the 
concealment of police identification numbers, the use of indiscriminate heavy-handed 
‘containment’ (especially ‘kettling’) and ‘distraction tactics’, and the role of the Territorial 
Support Group (TSG). The changing media environment also featured prominently in 
discussion of: the poor state of police-news-media relations, which generated tensions, 
frustrations and conflict between professional journalists and on the ground officers; the 
rapid and sophisticated use of multi-media communication technologies by protest groups, 
which by far surpassed the static communicative capabilities of the police; and the 
significance of the citizen journalist for intensifying public scrutiny of individual and 
collective police action, and in shaping public perceptions of the police. At the request of the 
Tomlinson family, an IPCC investigation was established specifically to consider the way the 
MPS and City of London Police handled the news media in the aftermath of Ian Tomlinson’s 
death.   
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The sheer level of institutional soul-searching and operational reflection that followed G20 
is in itself highly significant. That the official inquiries and the issues they raised were 
disseminated and debated so widely, and that the MPS was so heavily and universally 
criticised in the news media, presents a direct challenge to previous research findings that 
the police are superordinate commentators in the ‘hierarchy of credibility’, and foregrounds 
the rise of the citizen journalist as a key definitional force in the production of news. The 
nature and intensity of news coverage of the Ian Tomlinson case, substantiated by real-time 
citizen journalist footage of this and other incidents of police violence, and reinforced by the 
internet, made the MPS public order policing strategy a live political and policy issue that 
had to be addressed. Were it not for the incendiary ‘visual evidence’ handed to the news 
media by citizen journalists, the ‘story’ of Ian Tomlinson may never have taken off, the MPS 
may well have succeeded in denying or defusing allegations of police violence, and the 
policing of G20 may have ended up in MPS ‘Greatest Hits’ portfolio of how to police public 
order events in the capital. Because of citizen journalism, the operational integrity and 
institutional authority of the MPS was first of all questioned, and then successfully 
challenged. An official consensus emerged out of the various reviews that, whether the MPS 
agreed or not, a fundamental overhaul of its public order policing strategy was necessary 
(HMIC, 2009).  
 
Understanding the News Reporting of G20: Citizen Journalism, Hierarchies of Credibility, 
and the Market in Anti-Establishment News   
In the concluding section of this article, we seek to develop a sociological understanding of 
the news media’s collective transition from ‘protester violence’ to ‘police violence’ in the 
reporting of Ian Tomlinson’s death and the policing of the G20 Summit. To do this, we 
return to the core concepts of ‘inferential structure’ and ‘hierarchy of credibility’ and situate 
them within the context of the rapidly changing information-communications environment. 
Our discussion concentrates on three key issues: the capacity of technologically empowered 
citizen journalists to produce information that challenges the ‘official’ version of events; the 
inclination of professional and citizen journalists to actively seek out and use that 
information; and the existence of an information-communications marketplace that sustains 
the commodification and mass consumption of adversarial, anti-establishment news.  
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Citizen journalists are neither automatically nor naturally imbued with cultural authority: 
they are not ‘authorised knowers’ (Ericson et al, 1989), who can command access to 
mainstream news media ‘as of right’. Their position in the ‘hierarchy of credibility’ is 
precarious and contingent. News media access is not granted because of who citizen 
journalists are, but rather because of where they are and what they have. Their credibility 
and authenticity as news sources derives from their capacity to provide ‘factual’ visual 
evidence of ‘live events’ which, in a multi-platform news media market, constitutes an 
important and cost-effective resource for ‘making news’ (McNair, 2006). The technological 
ability of citizens to generate news has been accompanied by an equally important 
attitudinal shift as a new generation of news producers and consumers comes of age: where 
once citizens were content to be told what the news is, they are now increasingly interested 
in being part of the production process (Gilmour, 2004; Deuze, 2008).  
The citizen-generated ‘proof’ of police misconduct at G20 presented grave potential 
problems for the MPS. However, the dramatic and collective realignment of news media 
coverage that followed was by no means guaranteed. We have suggested throughout this 
article that understanding the transition between inferential structures – from ‘protester 
violence’ to ‘police violence’ – requires consideration of the wider environment within 
which both news media reporting and political protest currently exist and interact. As Cottle 
puts it (2008: 858), analysts must be sensitive to ‘the political contingencies and dynamics at 
work in contemporary protest and demonstration reporting’.  
The rise of the citizen journalist has been accompanied, and perhaps encouraged, by a 
decline in deference to authority and a deterioration of trust in official or elite institutions 
(Fukuyama, 2000; Seldon, 2009). Public scepticism and outrage is reflected and reinforced, 
and arguably amplified, across a market-driven news media faced with increasing 
competition and the acute need to generate audience interest in order to survive. Certainly, 
the escalating adversarialism of British political coverage has been acknowledged by 
academics and journalists alike (Lloyd, 2004; Milne, 2005). In what Barnett (2002) calls the 
‘age of contempt’, a prominent characteristic of political coverage is its ‘negativism and 
wilfully destructive attitude towards authority’ (McNair, 2006: 71). This ‘attack journalism’ is 
manifested routinely in a news media stance that is more antagonistic toward institutional 
authority and more likely to take seriously or treat as legitimate complaints against it. In the 
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extreme, it can translate into a ‘feeding frenzy’ (Sabato, 1993; Protess et al, 1991) involving 
the relentless pursuit of senior public figures with a view to ‘naming and shaming’ them to 
force them out of public office. Whilst editors may justify such aggressive journalistic 
practice as being ‘in the public interest’, a contemporary realisation of the news media’s 
historic Fourth Estate duty, it also has obvious market value. The Daily Telegraph, for 
example, benefited from a considerable sales boost and increased web traffic during its 
reporting of the House of Commons expenses scandal of 2009: the paper also won a string 
of plaudits at the 2010 Press Awards, including ‘newspaper of the year’, ‘scoop of the year’ 
and ‘journalist of the year’ (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8584356.stm). The Guardian’s in 
depth coverage of the G20 protests and Ian Tomlinson’s death likewise resulted in increased 
sales and web traffic, and Paul Lewis, who led on that coverage, won ‘reporter of the year’ 
at the same awards (ibid.). Thus, the widespread decline of deference to authority and the 
escalation of news media adversarialism have contributed to the creation of an unstable 
communicative space within which direct and high-visibility challenges to the institutionally 
powerful have gained cultural, commercial and professional currency. If citizen journalism 
has created a new source of cost-effective and newsworthy information, wider shifts within 
the news industry, journalistic practice and society have created a context within which that 
information can be profitably commodified and consumed.  
In addition to these macro-level changes, the MPS were experiencing particular problems of 
their own; most notably, deteriorating relations with the news media and the lasting legacy 
of previous scandals that weakened its operational integrity and institutional authority. In 
the immediate aftermath of the G20 protests, the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) 
received multiple complaints about alleged police assaults on reporters, the use of cordons, 
and refusals to release journalists from areas in which demonstrators were being contained. 
Police officers also used public order and counter terrorism legislation to stop reporters 
taking photographs (JCHR, 2009). What was perceived as a direct infringement of the 
freedom of the press did not sit well with many of those professional journalists present at 
G20. Nor was this the first time such police tactics had been used in public order situations 
and resulted in official complaints to the NUJ (JCHR, 2008). Thus, sections of the news media 
seem to have been primed for and receptive to information that challenged the MPS version 
of events surrounding Ian Tomlinson’s death. Such conditions increased the likelihood that 
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any citizen-generated evidence of police misconduct would resonate immediately in news 
centres. They helped facilitate the collective transition between inferential structures and 
the corresponding shift in news media focus from ‘protester violence’ and ‘police violence’.  
Furthermore, the involvement of the police in the death of Ian Tomlinson, the suggestion of 
a subsequent cover-up, and the wider problem of public order policing were only the latest 
in a series of controversies that worked cumulatively to undermine the MPS position in the 
news media ‘hierarchy of credibility’. A succession of high-profile institutional scandals, 
cover-ups and botched investigations – for example, the Stephen Lawrence, Jean Charles de 
Menezes and the Forest Gate cases – had damaged the MPS ‘brand’. In all three cases, each 
heavily reported and debated in the news media, the ‘official truth’ disseminated by MPS 
statements had been found to be incorrect and/or misleading (McLaughlin, 2007; Cottle, 
2005). Journalists and commentators also drew parallels between the death of Ian 
Tomlinson and that of Blair Peach in 1979. While the news frame of ‘police violence’ may 
not have been the default position of the news media, given the broader context, nor was it 
entirely unimaginable. The transition between inferential structures mobilised explanatory 
tropes and images that were already meaningful both to journalists and their audiences. 
Complaints of police violence and institutional cover-up at G20 were the latest 
manifestation of ‘known’ characteristics that could be projected against a familiar backdrop 
of institutional failure and professional incompetence. The reporting of G20, fuelled by the 
daily drip-drip of fresh video footage and witness testimonies and commentary, constituted 
an evolving and sensational exposé of police misconduct that simultaneously resonated with 
widespread public sensibilities and met the requirements for commercial success in a highly 
competitive, visually-oriented information-communications market place. Significantly, it 
was the citizen journalist and news media perspective, rather than the police perspective, 
that was assimilated into and validated by the official investigations and reports. Ultimately, 
it was this perspective that determined ‘what the story was’, structured the reporting of 
‘what had happened and why’, and drove further journalistic investigation and criticism of 
the MPS.  
Our analysis indicates that the rapid destabilisation of the initial inferential structure that 
reproduced and reinforced the police perspective, and the collective realignment of news 
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media attention from ‘protester violence’ to ‘police violence’, was sustained on a number of 
levels: at the macro level, by structural changes in the information-communications 
marketplace and the attitudes of both journalists and the public to authority; at the micro-
level, by poor police-news media relations, and the immediate and historic problems of 
operational integrity and institutional authority facing the MPS. In this unstable and 
unpredictable news media environment, the role of the MPS as ‘primary definers’ can no 
longer be taken for granted, and their super-ordinate status within the ‘hierarchy of 
credibility’ no longer assumed. As our research has illustrated, the citizen journalist provides 
a valuable additional source of real-time information which may challenge or confirm the 
institutional version of events. However, it is when citizen journalism challenges the ‘official 
truth’, as portrayed by those powerful institutional sources who have traditionally 
maintained a relatively uncontested position at the top of the ‘hierarchy of credibility’, that 
it becomes most potent as a news resource.   
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